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Privacy, Expression and the World Wide Web. Shall we Forget? 
 
Dr. Katy Ferris1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Google v Spain2  is an important judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union which has important implications for the rights of individuals’ 
privacy, the Court’s use of a purposive method of interpretation, the regulation 
of search engines based outside of the EU, the interaction between the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union and European Convention on Human Rights, and 
international laws. The case establishes that operators of search engines 
located outside of the EU may be subject to the EU data protection laws 
(Directive 95/46/EC) and individuals, in certain circumstances, have the right 
to request that links to personal data held on-line be removed. 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
The European Union (EU) Directive 95/46/EC – the Data Protection Directive3 
(DPD) - was adopted in 1995, when the World Wide Web was still in its 
infancy, and most Web-recognisable brand names did not exist. The first 
version of the code establishing the Google search engines was written in 
1996, and the company was officially founded in September 1998 – shortly 
before the deadline for transposition of the Directive.  
 
Directive 95/46/EC provides:   
 
(2) Whereas data-processing systems are designed to serve man; 
whereas they must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural 
persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the 
right to privacy, and contribute to economic and social progress, trade 
expansion and the well-being of individuals; 
 
(10)… the object of the national laws on the processing of personal 
data is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to 
privacy, which is recognised both in Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms… and in the general principles of Community law;.. for that 
reason, the approximation of those laws must not result in any 
lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, seek 
to ensure a high level of protection in the Community. 
 
The centrepiece of EU legislation on personal data protection (the DPD) was 
adopted with two objectives in mind: to protect the fundamental right to data 
protection and to guarantee the free flow of personal data between Member 
States. The DPD adopts a ‘holistic’ approach to data protection applying 
minimum principles to all stages of data processing, whilst generally not 
distinguishing between collection, storage, use or disclosure. 4  The 
relationship was examined between the DPD, the Charter of Fundamental 
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Rights of the European Union and the existence of search engines.  
 
The DPD thereby creates a system of controlling the ways in which data 
processing is handled within the EU and provides the data subject with a 
mechanism to correct inaccurate data and/or object to the data concerning 
him/her. The case subject to this article required an interpretation of the 
Directive’s provisions in light of the fundamental rights and freedoms laid 
down by the Charter.5  
 
Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
establishes the principle that everyone has the right to the protection of 
personal data concerning him or her. Moreover, Article 16(2) TFEU, 
introduced a specific legal basis for the adoption of rules on the protection of 
personal data. Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
enshrines protection of personal data as a fundamental right. Yet, pending the 
completion of negotiations for a revision of the Directive proposed by the EU 
Commission in 2012,6 this legislation has remained applicable to the World 
Wide Web as it has developed since 1995.  
 
1.1. PERSONAL DATA AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Google v Spain is the first case where the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has been required to interpret the DPD in relation to internet 
search engines.7 Many years of controversy as to whether (and if so, how) the 
DPD applies to key elements of the Web, such as social networks, search 
engines and cookies have culminated in this judgment. The first case of 
significance in relation to Google v Spain was heard in 2003. In the Lindqvist 
case8 the CJEU held a person who publishes personal data on a website 
processes the data and the publisher of the website is the data controller i.e. 
the person who has primary responsibility for data protection compliance.  
 
Mrs Lindqvist was an active member of her church in a parish in Sweden. As 
part of a computer course, Lindqvist had to set up an internet home page, she 
did so by creating a site giving information to church parishioners. Mrs 
Lindqvist included information about herself and eighteen fellow church 
volunteers. This information included some full names, telephone numbers 
and references to hobbies and jobs held by her volunteer colleagues. In 
relation to one colleague, Lindqvist also revealed that she had injured her foot 
and was, on medical grounds, working part-time.   
 
Lindqvist did not obtain her fellow volunteers' permission to post information 
about them on her website. In fact, Lindqvist failed to inform them about the 
postings before publication, although she did remove the web pages as soon 
as she received a request from her colleague to do so. 
 
Mrs Lindqvist was fined SEK 4,000 (approximately £300) for (a) processing 
personal data by automatic means without properly notifying the 
Datainspektion (the Swedish supervisory authority for the protection of 
electronically transmitted data); (b) transferring individuals' personal data, 
without consent, to countries not having similar levels of personal data 
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protection; and (c) processing individuals' sensitive personal data (the 
information concerning the volunteer with the foot injury) without consent. 
 
Lindqvist appealed. She contended that posting information on an Internet 
website did not amount to ‘processing personal data’ within the meaning of 
the DPD and that posting information on a website did not amount to a 
transfer of data to a third country. She also contended that the DPD does not 
apply to non-profit activities and that the sanctions she faced for violating the 
data protection requirements infringed her freedom of expression.  
 
The CJEU determined that posting individuals' names and telephone numbers 
(as well as information regarding their working conditions and hobbies) on a 
website did constitute the ‘processing’ of personal data for the purposes of the 
DPD. Having made this initial determination, it moved on to consider whether 
posting personal data on a website could be construed as ‘transferring’ such 
data to a third country. On this point, the CJEU supported the arguments 
made by Lindqvist, concluding that website operators posting personal data 
on-line are not subject to the legal regime governing the transfer of personal 
data unless (i) they actually send the personal information to Internet users 
who did not intentionally seek access to the webpages, or (ii) the server 
infrastructure is located in a non-EU country. This was a somewhat surprising 
decision at the time as it was inconsistent with the understanding held by 
many legal and Internet commentators and the interpretation of the law by 
national data protection authorities. It did offer some guidance on what would 
be considered as a ‘transfer’ within the context of an Internet post.  
 
Several issues, however, remained unanswered following the case which 
makes Google v Spain so significant. Lindqvist, unlike Google v Spain did not 
involve a profit making company collecting large amounts of data about 
individuals. The data controller in Lindqvist had the intention to enhance the 
community in which she lived in and through connection with others. There 
was no embarrassment on the part of the individuals and when she was 
asked to take down the material, she did. The CJEU did not address 
Lindqvist's claims that the restrictions imposed by the DPD limited her 
freedom of expression. It was arguably a minor exposure of limited personal 
information. Lindqvist’s lawyer at the time stated that ‘This decision 
emphasises the wide-reaching and indiscriminate nature of the European 
Union’s Data Protection Laws.’ 9  Finally, unlike Lindqvist, Google v Spain 
concerned the use of search engines. These issues were addressed in 
Google v Spain, perhaps with unfortunate consequences. 
 
2. THE ISSUE IN GOOGLE V SPAIN 
 
In early 1998, a newspaper (La Vanguardia) published, in its printed edition, a 
notice of a real estate auction in respect of the property of Spanish citizen 
Mario Costeja González for unpaid debts. He subsequently paid the debts 
and the auction of the house did not take place. Later, the publisher made the 
article available electronically. Ten years on, Google searches of the name 
Mario González brought up the newspaper advertisement. In November 2009, 
no longer wishing to have this record of an old newspaper report on his 
	 Ͷ
financial history (concerning social security debts) to be available,10 González 
contacted the publisher (La Vanguardia Ediciones SL) arguing the information 
was no longer of relevance and should be removed. The publisher responded 
that erasure of the data was not appropriate due to it being effected by the 
(domestic body) Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In February 2010, 
González contacted Google Spain SL requesting that search results not 
provide links to the newspaper article when his name was entered into its 
search engine. This request was forwarded to Google Inc. in the USA, as 
Google Spain SL considered it was the relevant organisation providing the 
Web-search service.  
 
Following these actions, González complained to the Spanish data protection 
authority (AEPD)11 that the publisher should be required to remove or rectify 
the information so his personal data was protected, and that Google Spain SL 
/ Google Inc. be required to remove or conceal his data regarding links to the 
newspaper article when his name was entered into the search engine. On 30 
July 2010, the AEPD rejected Costeja’s complaint against the publisher of La 
Vanguardia on the grounds that ‘the publication of the information was legal 
and was protected by the right to information.’12 The information in question 
was legally justified as it took place upon order of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs and was intended to give maximum publicity to the auction in 
order to secure as many bidders as possible. 
 
However, with inconsistency, it upheld his complaint against Google Spain 
and Google Inc., ordering the search engine to eliminate approximately 100 
links from all future searches for Costeja’s name. The AEPD considered in 
this regard that operators of search engines are subject to data protection 
legislation given that they carry out data processing for which they are 
responsible and act as intermediaries in the information society. The AEPD 
took the view that it has the power to require the withdrawal of data and the 
prohibition of access to certain data by the operators of search engines when 
it considers that the locating and dissemination of the data are liable to 
compromise the fundamental right to data protection and the dignity of 
persons in the broad sense, and this would also encompass the mere wish of 
the person concerned that such data not be known to third parties. The AEPD 
considered that that obligation may be owed directly by operators of search 
engines, without it being necessary to erase the data or information from the 
website where they appear, including when retention of the information on 
that site is justified by a statutory provision.13 
 
Google Spain SL and Google Inc. appealed to the Audiencia Nacional 
(National High Court) which, on a preliminary reference, referred questions on 
the meaning of the DPD to the CJEU. 
 
3. THE CJEU’s RULING 
 
The CJEU addressed four key issues in its judgment:  
 
3.1. THE MATERIAL SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE, I.E. WHETHER IT 
APPLIES TO SEARCH ENGINES  
	 ͷ
 
Until Google v Spain, It was widely assumed that further processing of the 
personal data by services such as search engines fell outside the scope of 
data protection law as the publisher of a website could restrict search engine 
indexing through the configuration of its website. This approach was the one 
advised to the CJEU by the Advocate-General (A-G) to be taken when dealing 
with this issue. The CJEU somewhat surprisingly disagreed with the A-G’s 
view that Google was not a data controller when it indexed personal data for 
its search engine. 
 
A-G Jääskinen had argued the position in Lindqvist that the publisher of a 
webpage containing personal data is a data controller. However, he was of 
the view that a person is not a data controller unless he or she is aware of the 
existence of a defined category of personal data. In light of his view as to how 
a data controller should be defined, A-G Jääskinen felt that because Google 
does not have an awareness of personal data other than as a statistical fact, 
and since the personal data is assembled randomly with all the other internet 
data, Google indexes including non-personal data should not have been 
considered to establish Google as a data controller. The A-G was of the view 
that search engines providing, as they do, an important service for internet 
users, should arguably enjoy a degree of exemption from data protection 
liability analogous to that which applies to e-commerce intermediaries 
providing information society services on an automated, passive, technical 
basis with no control over the information carried on the service. 
 
In the event that the CJEU did not agree with his submission that Google is 
not a data controller, the A-G considered questions relating to a right to be 
forgotten. He held that the rights of freedom of information and expression 
took precedence over any such right to erasure, and urged the Court not to 
allow case-by-case resolution of such conflicts as that would likely lead to the 
‘automatic withdrawal of links to any objected contents or to an 
unmanageable number of requests handled by the most popular and 
important internet search engine service providers.’14 
 
Google had argued that search engines do not distinguish between data 
protected by the DPD (personal data) and other data, and that furthermore it 
had no control over the data or its selection. At a national level, the argument 
presented was that Google was not a ‘controller’15 but rather was merely 
replicating the data and not involved with data processing. Consequently, 
Google considered that it did not ‘determine […] the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data’ as required by the terms of the DPD. The 
CJEU rejected these arguments. The CJEU ruled a search engine operator is 
a data controller16 as defined under Art 2(d) as ‘it determines the purpose and 
means of the processing’ of the data it collects and shares. It was not 
contested that the data contained therein was of a ‘personal’17 nature, as 
required by the DPD. It was said that ‘a search engine ‘collects’ such data 
which it subsequently ‘retrieves’, ‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the 
framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case 
may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of 
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search results.’18 This would appear to be a broad definition being adopted as 
to the concept of a ‘controller.’  
 
The CJEU chose not to follow Google’s argument or the A-G’s line of 
reasoning where awareness and intent were critical characteristics of a data 
controller in relation to personal data posted on the Internet. It agreed that 
publication of personal data on a website constitutes processing. However, 
the CJEU had no doubt that the operations of a search engine themselves 
constituted processing of personal data regardless of the fact that such 
operations did not alter the personal data or distinguish it from non-personal 
data. In reaching this conclusion it considered the impact of the search engine 
on linking individuals to results. The CJEU concluded that: 
 
‘as the activity of a search engine is therefore liable to affect 
significantly, and additionally compared with that of the publishers of 
websites, the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of 
personal data, the operator of the search engine as the person 
determining the purposes and means of that activity must ensure, 
within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that 
the activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 in order that the 
guarantees laid down by the directive may have full effect and that 
effective and complete protection of data subjects, in particular of their 
right to privacy, may actually be achieved.’19 
 
Ultimately, the CJEU found each of Google’s activities such as collecting and 
retrieving, storing data etc. to satisfy ‘processing’ regardless of the fact that it 
also carries out the same operations in respect of other types of information 
and does not distinguish between the latter and the personal data. It ruled the 
automatic actions of a search engine fall squarely within the activities listed in 
the definition of processing in Art 2(b) of the Directive. 
 
3.2. THE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE, I.E. WHETHER IT 
APPLIES TO A SUBSIDIARY, GOOGLE SPAIN, GIVEN THAT THE 
PARENT COMPANY IS BASED IN CALIFORNIA, USA  
 
When considering whether the DPD applied to Google, the CJEU considered 
two possible outcomes. The first was that Google’s activities naturally fell 
within Article 4(1)(a) which applies the DPD to those with an ‘establishment’ in 
a Member State.20 The second relates to Article 4(1)(c) which concerns the 
‘use of equipment situated on the territory of the said Member State.’ 
 
In arriving at its conclusion, the CJEU emphasised the purpose of the DPD 
and the need to protect privacy.21  The CJEU considered that the use of 
advertisements in Spain could be seen to have satisfied the requirement that 
the processing be ‘carried out in the context of the activities’ of the EU 
establishment. The CJEU concluded: 
 
‘the activities of the operator of the search engine and those of its 
establishment situated in the Member State concerned are inextricably 
linked since the activities relating to the advertising space constitute 
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the means of rendering the search engine at issue economically 
profitable and that engine is, at the same time, the means enabling 
those activities to be performed.’22 
 
The CJEU felt that the activities of Google Spain are, in reality, linked to the 
search function of its parent company, the processing therefore fell within Art 
4(1)(a) because it was carried out ‘in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of the controller’ within a Member State. The DPD, in the 
manner implemented by Spain, applied. The CJEU declined from ruling on the 
other possibilities with regards to the scope of the Directive and so those 
issues remain open in respect of the internet. The CJEU did go as far as 
saying the rules on the span of the DPD ‘cannot be interpreted restrictively’, 
and that it had ‘a particularly broad territorial scope.’23  
 
3.3. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SEARCH ENGINE OPERATORS  
 
The CJEU stated that search engine operators are responsible, separate from 
the original webpage publishers, for removing information on data subjects 
from search engine results, even where the publication on the original news or 
webpages might be lawful.  
 
The question became whether the complainant had the right to demand 
erasure, blocking or rectification when this was not on the basis of the data 
being inaccurate. The CJEU ruled that within the scope of the DPD there is a 
right to demand rectification where the processing was unlawful for other 
reasons, including non-compliance with any other ground in the DPD relating 
to data quality or criteria for data processing, or in the context of the right to 
object to data processing on ‘compelling legitimate grounds’. The result being 
that individuals that are the subject of data could request that search engines 
erase personal data from their search results and if they were to refuse the 
request the data subject would have avenue of complaint to the supervisory 
authorities or courts on refusal.  
 
Article 7(f) of the DPD provides that in some circumstances there can be a 
ground for processing data if it is in the legitimate interests of the controller. 
There would need to be no contract, public interest requirement, legal 
obligation or consent by the data subject for this ground to apply. In this case 
the court decided that here those interests were ‘overridden’ by the rights of 
the data subject. This necessitates a balancing exercise of rights – that of the 
public right to freedom of expression and that of right to privacy. Google 
raised the argument it had fallen under the ground of having a public and 
economic interest in the data being available. The CJEU stated that the huge 
impact on the right to privacy ‘cannot be justified by merely the economic 
interest of Google as the search engine operator’.24  
 
It is important to note that the CJEU drew a distinction between the operator 
of the website and a search engine. Stating that even if the continued 
processing of the data on the website was lawful, it does not follow that 
processing for generating search results will be lawful. It appears from the 
decision on this point, the greater impact of a search engine’s results in an 
	 ͺ
even more stringent application of the test on the impact on the right to 
privacy. It goes beyond a mere balancing of the rights in such a case.  
 
There then remains the possibility that a request for erasure could result in the 
information removed or blocked from the search engine whilst it remains 
available in full on the original website. The CJEU was clear on the view that 
search engines like Google cannot rely on the argument of ‘journalistic’25 
exception from the Directive. Interestingly, this was an answer to a question 
not actually presented to the CJEU during the case.  
 
3.4. THE CONCEPT OF THE ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’, I.E. THE 
RIGHT OF AN INDIVIDUAL TO INSIST (IN THIS CASE) THAT HIS OR HER 
HISTORY BE REMOVED FROM ACCESSIBILITY VIA A SEARCH ENGINE 
 
The CJEU accepted the arguments that the DPD’s requirements that data of 
such a personal nature must be retained for limited periods of time. It would 
only be for as long as it is relevant and that ultimately this amounts to a form 
of ‘right to be forgotten.’26 The CJEU left it to the referring national court to 
apply this right to be forgotten to the facts of this case which leads the 
national court to the conclusion that the data subject’s rights had been 
violated.  
 
The CJEU concluded that: 
 
‘as the activity of a search engine is therefore liable to affect 
significantly, and additionally compared with that of the publishers of 
websites, the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of 
personal data, the operator of the search engine as the person 
determining the purposes and means of that activity must ensure, 
within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that 
the activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 in order that the 
guarantees laid down by the directive may have full effect and that 
effective and complete protection of data subjects, in particular of their 
right to privacy, may actually be achieved.’27 
 
The decision has repercussions in terms of the applicability of EU law even to 
non-EU-based companies and the rights that individuals have against those 
processing their data. This is not limited to first publishers of material but 
those who republish – including search engines. 
 
An interesting nuance of the decision was that the conclusion reached by the 
CJEU may have been different if there had been an interest of the general 
public having access to the information, such as where the data subject has a 
role in public life. If the personal data generated by way of search results is no 
longer relevant, or is excessive with respect to the purpose for which it was 
originally processed, the search engine operator must remove the material 
unless retaining the results is otherwise justified. It is not fully clear to where 
‘justification’ extends.  
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The case is now returned to the Spanish National Court. The CJEU decision 
does not arguably go as far as establishing an individual’s ‘right to be 
forgotten.’28 However, it is the requirement of those controlling the search 
engine to stop processing data upon receipt of a valid request from the data 
subject. Questions abound regarding how the search engine controller 
lawfully responds to that request.  
 
4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION – AN ATTACK ON THE 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW?  
 
The CJEU has effectively ruled that Google acquires data protection 
obligations at the point that it collects the information from the Web. Google 
now finds itself having to respond to complaints from individuals29 that their 
personal data, found as a result of a Google search, is too historical to 
arguably be of relevance any more, whether that information is inaccurate or 
not. Google can then be challenged further before a supervisory authority or 
in the national courts.  
 
An issue with which data controllers such as Google will have to contend is 
with what other requirements they will need to comply from now on? Under 
EU data protection, it is possible Google could be obliged to provide privacy 
notices. Google has the challenge of treading a fine line when making what 
may be termed a difficult decision as to what amounts to ‘inadequate and/or 
irrelevant’ material. There is even the possibility that it will be considered as 
having a positive obligation to act as soon as it has information, as it is 
identified as a data controller at the point of receipt. This is arguably a 
departure from what people would traditionally view as within the operations 
and remit of a search engine.  
 
The decision can be viewed as a clear acknowledgement of the reality of 
modern day internet use and the role of search engines as they deliver 
information to their users. Ultimately a search engine is going to deliver a 
more rounded and complete picture about a person’s entire life, more so 
perhaps than a third party would be able to obtain through other avenues, and 
as a result risks greater intrusion. In the judgment30 the CJEU referred to the 
Directive’s ‘objective,’ or a specific provision, as being to ‘ensure… effective 
and complete protection’ of data subjects, but this phraseology is absent in 
the DPD reading.  
 
4.1. SOCIAL NETWORKS / MEDIA 
 
Whilst the ruling concerns search engines alone, it can clearly have wider 
implications. The relevance of it in respect of social networks needs careful 
consideration. If the search engine complained of is a non-EU subsidiary that 
sells advertising in a Member State as part of its Internet services, then on 
direct transposition of this case they will be regarded as falling under the remit 
of the DPD.  
 
Prior to the CJEU’s ruling, it was considered that social media may be limited 
from exposure to the adverse effects of the DPD. Twitter’s operations were 
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based in the US which were arguably outside of the remit of both the domestic 
and EU laws, whilst Facebook, through its operations being delivered from its 
base in Dublin, was subject to the laws. However, given Google v Spain, both 
corporations are subject to EU data protection and privacy laws and, 
particularly given the nature of Twitter users’ comments and re-tweeting 
information, the poster’s of material which may constitute a criminal offence31 
or could later prove embarrassing, may wish for their removal. Users may be 
able to approach Twitter or Facebook (notorious for the difficulties in users 
being able to remove their accounts) to delete information posted about them 
rather than it remaining online indefinitely (and available through searches 
and re-tweets). Further, given Google’s reported acceptance of requests to 
remove links to information, seemingly without much hesitation, it further 
provokes questions as to the likely winner in the privacy v freedom of 
expression battle. If Twitter and Facebook follow a similar passive route, and 
for the avoidance of further legal action and potential costs why wouldn’t they, 
information may become more difficult to access, not because it is 
unavailable, private or sensitive, but simply because a form was completed 
and the search engine / source chose the path of least resistance rather than 
entering an argument with the data subject. Accuracy of the information, albeit 
potentially embarrassing for the data subject, is not seemingly at issue when 
the choice is made to remove the entry from future searches listings. 
 
4.2. PRIVACY 
 
There is an argument that the CJEU has overly concerned itself with the right 
to privacy and in enforcing it they have excluded the other rights applicable in 
such cases. In the case, the CJEU appears to have set an automatic test: if 
the individual data subject is not a public figure then their interest will override 
the economic interest of the search engine. It is worth noting that not every 
individual that has historical data online about him or her will choose to 
challenge this, it will most likely be those who feel some form of 
embarrassment/unease as to the data, 32  however that number could be 
significant. It is obviously less likely that an individual would seek to remove 
reports of positive achievements. The removal requests will probably focus on 
links to sites hosting unfavourable details of the individual.  
 
Privacy is a significant concern to private individuals given the invasive nature 
of modern technology33  (perpetuated in many cases by the person’s own 
actions by submitting personal and professional material and data on various 
social media sites), the ubiquity of technology and information on demand, 
and the nature of information available through internet search engines which 
may ‘live’ for a much longer period of time and remain ‘relevant’ when a 
person’s name is the subject of a search, compared with other media. Search 
engines further face a problem given the information which is returned. For 
other media searches, specific terms, issues, criteria or facts may need to be 
selected before information on that basis is provided. With Mr González, a 
simple search of his name gave the return of the embarrassing information 
regarding his financial situation near the top of the first page of search results. 
This result did not require any further and specific search criteria to be 
entered into the engine other than the individual’s name. This clearly is 
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problematic given, first, González’s status as a private individual, secondly, 
the limitation, in the UK at least, of any likelihood of successfully arguing a 
breach of data protection laws34 or the award of damages for a failure to 
remove data,35 and thirdly, the web has existed for many years on the basis 
that information is primarily publicly available and free – albeit with the 
personal costs to individuals who may not wish all data held about them to be 
so readily accessible. 
 
Google was obligated to secure the effective and complete protection of the 
data subject’s rights and freedoms as envisaged by the DPD.36 The CJEU 
held that information on a search engine’s results list ‘makes access to that 
information appreciably easier for any internet user… and may play a decisive 
role in the dissemination of that information, it is liable to constitute a more 
significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to privacy 
than the publication on the web page.’37 This places a significant burden on 
Google as to protecting the data protection interests of individuals, and 
perhaps more surprisingly given the interaction between the EU and the EU 
Fundamental Rights Charter 38  and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 39  the CJEU was silent on the balancing of rights and obligations 
between the individual’s right to privacy / be forgotten and the fundamental 
right of freedom of expression. By implication, it appears that privacy trumps 
freedom of expression (unless the individual is a public figure / the information 
is in the public interest), but at what cost? The answer to that question will 
likely require years of judicial and legislative pronouncement, commentary 
and reasoning, however it is possible at this early stage to remark that the 
ruling imposes more stringent obligations on search engines than it does on 
the original website which hosts the published information. The search 
engines may not, held the CJEU,40 rely on the journalistic exception within the 
DPD, although that is a defence available to the original publisher. There will 
be a difference in the obligations imposed on search engines compared with 
the information that is hosted and available on websites which appears odd 
and will need legislative action to provide direction and definition of the extent 
of obligations. The CJEU acknowledged41 that the nature of internet search 
engines and the results pages provides an overview of personal data which 
may be widely used and causes concern for the person’s privacy. However, 
given that the ruling does not require the original information or its original 
source / host to remove the information, it can only be seen as a worrying 
movement away from freedom of expression and freedom of information 
(freedoms which have been fought for and secured against increasing threats 
by governments of all persuasions).  
 
A particularly important question to be answered is what amounts to a public 
figure? In the days of TV and the media making ordinary people celebrities 
through reality shows, it is increasingly difficult to see where the line will be 
drawn. This public interest aspect was narrowly construed. The CJEU 
appears to give little thought to the issue of freedom of expression – Article 11 
of the EU Charter, Article 10 of the EU convention. The CJEU did not see it as 
being relevant or engaged in the case.  
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Many different interests are considered to be at stake here, with privacy being 
just one of them. Privacy appears to have won the first round, but there are 
likely more rounds to come with new cases. The operators of websites in the 
EU can potentially be drawn into protracted disputes over whether there is a 
specific public interest in the publication of the information under review, even 
where it is neither prejudicial nor private.  
 
It will be important for the many players and users of the internet to watch how 
the decision is implemented in the future and it will be of interest to conduct 
research on whom become the primary take-down/erasure requesters over 
time.  The question remains whether a supervisory authority could act on its 
own volition to enforce the judgment. On reading the case it would appear that 
the rights at issue are only those triggered by an individual complaining and 
so it is unlikely. Privacy campaigners may raise the issue of whether to 
introduce a human element to check through material, which is being indexed, 
prior to information being made publicly available.  
 
An area of significance, unclear from the judgment, is the criteria to be 
satisfied when determining materials as ‘historical’? How long will have to 
pass before the data is no longer relevant? If it relates to a debt, which has 
been paid in a short time and is no longer outstanding, the data subject may 
consider that historical on that basis but that may not be a sufficient passage 
of time as envisaged by the CJEU to satisfy this criterion. How will this be 
judged? Some data subjects may feel a greater level of embarrassment than 
others, over the same information. Will that have any bearing on the decision-
making?  
 
4.3. THE EXTENT OF THE RULING 
 
Given the nature of the world wide web and internet searches generally, 
international jurisdictions can be problematic where information transmission 
is concerned. It has been suggested that Google is approaching the ruling by 
modifying the results of searches through ‘EU versions’ of its engine whilst 
individuals who make the positive choice of selecting the ‘.com’ version will 
have full access to all, unfiltered, search results. It is also the case that 
preventing access to materials will not be prevented through this ruling, simply 
that the individual who wishes to discover information regarding a data subject 
may have to undertake a little more research than simply ‘Googling’ for an 
answer.42 It is possible that Google may choose the simple route of filtering all 
results across its domains, not just applying the filters to EU-based versions of 
its engine, but this is more likely to be seen as overkill and unnecessary given 
the limitation to data subjects as search terms. Further, there will always be 
differing rules and interpretations on acceptable behaviour, offensive material, 
and the variances of public sensibilities between States. The facts of the case 
here involved a Spanish national, in Spain, being affected by a domestic rule 
regarding published material accessed through an internet search engine. 
Expanding the effects of removing direct access to the material regarding the 
individual from searches across the world seems unnecessary and counter 
productive. A ‘one size fits all’ mechanism would be unlikely to be effective, 
nor would this ever be desirable given the territorial / jurisdictional factors 
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involved. The Google ruling will affect searches in the geographical 
jurisdiction of the State concerned – but perhaps no further. Given the 
rationale for the ruling, that individuals (data subjects) should have the right, in 
limited circumstances, that information relating to them is not accessible 
through the search engine, does restricting the application of this decision to 
Google searches within the State in which he or she resides sufficiently 
provide the respect for privacy that is being sought? Will the consequence of 
the ruling result in a shift in the habits of users of Google to use the .com site 
in preference to their domestic domain,43 and if so, will this have any effect on 
future EU and domestic legislative initiatives?  
 
5. REFORM OF THE DATA PROTECTION LAWS 
 
As mentioned above the DPD was established before Google had been 
created and the CJEU considered the relationship between the DPD, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the existence of search 
engines. The CJEU interpreted the DPD’s provisions in light of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms laid down by the Charter and went as far as 
stating that the requirements that derive from these Charter rights are 
implemented in various Articles of the DPD. Therefore, arguably, the CJEU 
interpreted the provisions of the DPD in a wide manner, utilising a purposive 
reasoning, but also suggesting that protection afforded in the DPD is in need 
of reform.44   
 
So where does the European Commission go from here with its plans for 
reform? 
 
‘they will continue pushing for a speedy adoption of the data protection 
reform, including the reinforced and modernised Right to be Forgotten. 
The Commission expects search engine operators to further develop 
well-functioning tools and procedures, which ensure that individuals 
can request the deletion of their personal data when they are 
inaccurate, inadequate, or irrelevant or no longer relevant – under the 
control of competent authorities in particular data protection 
authorities.’45  
 
The search engines that had previously been faltering in their support of the 
proposed reforms may now view it as an opportunity to limit any liability they 
might otherwise have following this ruling. We may see greater co-operation 
in negotiations, however this will be some time in the making, even with an 
increased impetus to address this matter.  
 
We are fast approaching 1 billion websites46 and whilst Google has been 
deemed an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of the DPD, other search 
engines may not pass the threshold to satisfy this test.  
 
The judgment made it clear that privacy rights have to be balanced with other 
rights. The CJEU saw Google as having its only countervailing right as one of 
commercial interest. Google would appear to have fallen victim of its own 
success, for it seems that it is now operating under a greater
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obligation than it had foreseen. With newspapers and other online publishers, 
the position may be different. The competing right to freedom of expression is 
much stronger, as has been repeatedly emphasised by the European Court of 
Human Rights. The Strasbourg court has a longer track record in this area 
than its CJEU counterpart in Luxembourg; something to which the CJEU is 
likely to pay considerable regard when determining the balance between 
privacy and other rights. Newspaper archives could perhaps be said to be 
more similar in nature to Google's search service than the daily news. 
However, newspapers' archives have traditionally been widely seen as an 
important matter of public record and the arguments supporting them are very 
strong in a way which simply does not apply to Google. The CJEU found that 
there was something particularly invasive in the way Google collated 
information relating to individuals from across the Web. Arguably this does not 
apply in the same degree in respect of newspaper archives. The debate may 
progress to the propriety of the continued availability of old personal data in 
online newspaper archives.  
 
5.1. THE UK’S RESPONSE 
 
Most recently, a question raised by Lord Birt in the House of Lords questioned 
the Government’s legislative intentions in light of the CJEU ruling. In a written 
response, 47  Lord Faulkes stated the Government was considering the 
implications of the ruling and that the work being undertaken by the 
Committee of European Data Protection Authorities to develop criteria to be 
used by search engine operators when considering requests for deletion, was 
being closely monitored. The guidance is needed by search engines 
operators to enable them to strike the right balance between the privacy rights 
of individuals and other interests, including the public interest in retaining the 
information.  
  
Lord Faulkes further identified the negotiations on a replacement General 
Data Protection Regulation ongoing in the Council of the EU, including the 
proposed ‘right to be forgotten’ provisions. The Government opposes48 the 
stance adopted by the Commission in relation to the ‘right to be forgotten’ as it 
wishes to avoid the pitfall of setting unrealistic expectations for data subjects 
which do not exist in practice (in part at least, due to the technological 
limitations in existence). The Government, further, considers that an obligation 
to inform other controllers of a request under the ‘right to be forgotten’ should 
be more transparent and proportionate. A potential conflict49 between the UK, 
and the requirements of the European Union and being a signatory to the 
European Convention on Human Rights could be the result of the ruling and 
the UK’s stance towards data protection and technological limitations.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
If the extent of this case remains narrow, relating to a search engine, then the 
significance is clearly lessened, however the CJEU appears to have issued a 
ruling which has potential to be more far reaching. Only time will tell as to 
what its full implications are. The position in which we are left is data 
controllers potentially having to remove data which is sensitive and prejudicial, 
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and even going as far as a proactive duty not to release such material from 
the start. That is where the argument lies, but this would be a radical 
departure from the freedom of expression and the legal tensions between the 
convention rights and EU Treaty rights, not to mention the international 
dimension of possible reactions of companies based in the US / outside the 
EU complying with EU regulations.  
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